WaxWorks
|
Friday, August 26, 2005
To Recuse or Not To Recuse
There's been some interesting discussion about John Roberts' decision not to recuse himself from a detainee case involving President Bush as a defendant that he heard on the DC Circuit just several days after he was first interviewed by the White House for a potential Supreme Court vacancy. (Here's a good summary of the issues involved). Legal ethics experts have said that, once Roberts was being interviewed by the Administration for prospective employment, he should have recused himself from the detainee case, or, at a minimum, informed the parties of his discussions, which would have allowed a party to make a formal motion for his recusal.
There's some pretty good precedent in favor of the argument that Roberts should have recused himself:
In 1985, a federal appeals court in Chicago cited the requirement of the
appearance of impartiality when it ordered the recusal of a federal judge who,
planning to leave the bench, had hired a "headhunter" to approach law firms in
the city. By mistake—and, in fact, contrary to the judge's instructions—the
headhunter contacted two opposing firms in a case then pending before the judge.
One firm rejected the overture outright. The other was negative but not quite as
definitive. Writing for the Court of Appeals, Judge Richard A. Posner emphasized
that the trial judge "is a judge of unblemished honor and sterling character,"
and that he "is accused of, and has committed, no impropriety." Nevertheless,
the court ordered the judge to recuse himself because of the appearance of
partiality. "The dignity and independence of the judiciary are diminished when
the judge comes before lawyers in the case in the role of a suppliant for
employment. The public cannot be confident that a case tried under such
conditions will be decided in accordance with the highest traditions of the
judiciary." Although both law firms had refused to offer him employment, the
court held that "an objective observer might wonder whether [the judge] might
not at some unconscious level favor the firm … that had not as definitively
rejected him."
In the fall and winter of 1984, a criminal-trial judge in the District
of Columbia was discussing a managerial position with the Department of Justice
while the local U.S. attorney's office—which is part of the department—was
prosecuting an intent-to-kill case before him. Following the conviction and
sentence, the judge was offered the department job and accepted. On appeal, the
United States conceded that the judge had acted improperly by presiding at the
trial during the employment negotiations. It argued, however, that the
conviction should not be overturned. The appeals court disagreed. Relying on
Judge Posner's opinion in the Chicago case, as well as the rules of
judicial ethics, the court vacated the conviction even though the defendant did
not "claim that his trial was unfair or that the [the judge] was actually biased
against him." The court was "persuaded that an objective observer might have
difficulty understanding that [the judge] did not … realize … that others might
question his impartiality."
But Roberts did not. Interestingly, back when he worked in the Reagan White House, he faced a similar issue and chose to recuse himself in that occassion:
In 1986, when John Roberts was working in the White House Counsel’s Office
for President Reagan, he was asked to review a mundane request by an attorney
named Lester Hyman. Roberts replied:
I must recuse myself from this matter, in light of pending discussions
with Mr. Hyman’s firm about future employment.
Now, let's be clear, the precedents cited above do not require that the individual be influenced in his judicial decision making by the employment offers, but rather that the appearance alone should require recusal. Roberts recognized that in 1986, but in 2005, when he was faced with numerous other potential applicants for one of only 9 jobs, he may have decided he needed to impress the people making the job offer as much as possible.
Comments:
Post a Comment